

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AEC-11

CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-07 SS-20

OMB-01 NIC-01 AECE-00 DRC-01 SAM-01 /170 W

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P R 081522Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7669

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

DIA WASHDC

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 5141

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM, UR, US

SUBJ: PRAVDA ON SALT

REF: A. USDAO MOSCOW 350

B. USDAO MOSCOW 555

C. MOSCOW 2198

D. STATE 50144

1. SUMMARY: PRAVDA ARTICLE APRIL 7 ON SALT ACCUSES
AMERICAN "MILITARISTS" OF HOPING TO RESTORE U.S.

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LOST STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY BY QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT

OF WEAPONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW PARAMETERS FOR USING THEM IN ORDER TO EXERT PRESSURE ON SOCIALIST CAMP (WITH AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT THIS MAY ONLY BE FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES). PRAVDA CHARGES THAT NEW STRATEGIC DOCTRINE OF TARGET OPTIONS AS WELL AS PROPOSALS FOR USE OF MINI-NUKES IN EUROPE CONTRADICT SPIRIT OF U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE PNW AGREEMENT OF JUNE 1973. ARTICLE FOCUSES ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS AS THE HANG-UP IN SALT II. WHILE BURDEN OF ARTICLE IS REFUTATION OF ALLEGED U.S. OPPONENTS OF SALT, PRAVDA EXPRESSES HOPEFUL VIEW THAT CURRENT SALT NEGOTIATIONS CAN BRING CONSTRUCTIVE RESULTS IF BOTH SIDES REALLY DESIRE AGREEMENT. MESSAGE MAY BE IN PART THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THESE MATTERS IS NOT HELPFUL. END SUMMARY.

2. PRAVDA ARTICLE BY COL. V. LARIONOV, WHO IS ATTACHED TO USA INSTITUTE AND HAS WRITTEN PREVIOUSLY ON STRATEGIC ARMS TOPICS, IS FITTINGLY TITLED "ARMS CONTROL AND ITS OPPONENTS." BEFORE TAKING ON THE OPPONENTS, LARIONOV PUTS SALT IN CONTEXT OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE (AS SPECIFIED IN 1972 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS) AND 1973 AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. HE POINTS TO ABM TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AS EVIDENCE OF UNDERSTANDING OF DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NEED TO CURB ARMS RACE.

3. TURNING TO CURRENT PHASE OF SALT, LARIONOV FINDS SOME ADVANTAGES OVER SALT ONE. IN FIRST PLACE, POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE HAS IMPROVED. SECONDLY, TALKS REPRESENT CONTINUATION OF DIALOGUE WHICH BENEFITS FROM ACCUMULATED MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF PREVIOUS SALT EFFORTS. FINALLY, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN AGREED (EVIDENTLY A REFERENCE TO 1973 SUMMIT DOCUMENT). AT SAME TIME, LARIONOV ACKNOWLEDGES COMPLEXITIES OF CURRENT ROUND, WHICH ARE RELATED MAINLY TO GREATER DIFFICULTY OF FINDING COMPARABILITY CRITERIA FOR QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS THAN FOR QUANTITATIVE CURBS. DESPITE COMPLEXITIES, CONFIDENTIAL

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HE SAYS TALKS CAN LEAD TO POSITIVE RESULTS IF BOTH SIDES HAVE REAL DESIRE TO REACH AGREEMENT.

4. LARIONOV CHARGES THAT INFLUENTIAL CIRCLES IN U.S. OPPOSED TO DETENTE, TOGETHER WITH MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, ARE TRYING TO POISON ATMOSPHERE OF TALKS AND SOW DISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES. HE NAMES SENATORS JACKSON, GOLDWATER AND BUCKLEY AS EXAMPLES OF THOSE

WHO ARE TO BLAME. THEY ALLEGEDLY INSIST THAT U.S. MUST REACH AGREEMENT WITH USSR ONLY FROM POSITION OF STRENGTH, MUST ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, AND IF AGREEMENT IS TO BE REACHED WITH USSR IT MUST BE WITH GUARANTEE OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES FOR THE U.S. LARIONOV POINTS OUT, HOWEVER, THAT NONE OF THIS IS NEW - SENATOR JACKSON WAS SAYING THE SAME THING AT NATO MILITARY COUNCIL BONN MEETING IN DECEMBER 1972. HE GOES ON TO QUOTE JACKSON'S URGING IN BONN SPEECH THAT U.S. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE SHOULD REFLECT NECESSITY FOR STRENGTH, AND HE FINDS JACKSON TAKING SAME POSITION TODAY IN RELATION TO PENTAGON REQUESTS FOR FUNDS TO IMPROVE MIRV ACCURACY.

5. BY INFERENCE, WHAT LARIONOV FINDS TO BE NEW (AND PRESUMABLY THE REASON FOR THE ARTICLE) IS WIDESPREAD DISCUSSION TOUCHED OFF BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENTS ON U.S. REVIEW OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY. LARIONOV QUOTES SCHLESINGER JANUARY 10 REMARKS TO ASSOCIATION OF U.S. FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS ABOUT REVIEW OF TARGETING OPTIONS. HE CONCEDES THAT THIS QUESTION IS INTERNAL BUSINESS OF PENTAGON PLANNERS, BUT HE VIEWS PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF GUIDELINES FOR WAGING NUCLEAR WAR AS HARMFUL TO PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. VIABILITY OF ANY AGREEMENT, HE CAUTIONS, IS DEPENDENT ON OBSERVING ITS SPIRIT AS WELL AS ITS LETTER. HE SHARES CONCERN OF NEWSMAN WHO ASKED WHETHER PROCESS (OF REVIEWING DOCTRINE) MIGHT NOT DEVELOP ITS OWN MOMENTUM.

6. LARIONOV IS BOTHERED BY A SECOND POINT IN "NEW NUCLEAR STRATEGY OF THE PENTAGON" REFERRING TO PROPOSALS FOR USE OF MINI-NUKES IN EUROPE AS OUTLINED
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RECENTLY BY GENERAL GOODPASTER. HE ASSERTS THIS DOCTRINE NOT ONLY BLURS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WAR AND THUS VITIATES STRUGGLE AGAINST DANGER OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT, BUT IT ALSO CONTRADICTS SPIRIT OF U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENTS.

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7. LARIONOV CONCEDES THAT SOME OF THE TALK ABOUT NEW U.S. DOCTRINES MAY BE FORM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXERCISE TO BRING PRESSURE ON SOVIET UNION, THUS OBLIQUELY ACKNOWLEDGING THE "BARGAINING CHIP" APPROACH, BUT HE WARNS THAT EVERY STRATEGY AND EVERY REVIEW IN PAST HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY PRACTICAL STEPS IN WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. HE DECLARES THAT MILITARISTIC CIRCLES IN THE U.S. HAVE HIGH HOPES OF REGAINING AT SOME FUTURE POINT THE LOST NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY OF THE U.S. THROUGH QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN WEAPONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW PARAMETERS FOR THEIR USE IN EXERTING PRESSURE ON SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. HE FINDS CONVINCING EVIDENCE IN POST-WAR HISTORY THAT SUCH EFFORTS ARE DOOMED, BUT HE WARNS
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NEVERTHELESS THAT THEY HINDER IMPROVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. AGREEING WITH FULBRIGHT THAT ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IS COLD WAR WITH ITS POLEMICS, ARMS RACE AND BRINKSMANSHIP,

LARIONOV SAYS AMERICAN PEOPLE INCREASINGLY REJECT THAT ALTERNATIVE.

8. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH LARIONOV IS BLUNT IN ACCUSING "SOME CIRCLES" OF PURSUING STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, HIS BRIEF EVIDENTLY CONSTRAINS HIM FROM IMPLYING THAT PROSPECTS FOR SALT TWO AGREEMENT ARE SERIOUSLY DIMMED BY THE ACTIVITIES OF ARMS CONTROL OPPONENTS. AT MOST, ARTICLE MAY BE EFFORT TO HEDGE PUBLIC POSITION IF SALT AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVE UNATTAINABLE IN 1974 TIME FRAME ENVISAGED AT WASHINGTON SUMMIT.

9. IN CRITICIZING REVIEW OF TARGETING AND MINI-NUKES, LARIONOV IS CAREFUL TO CLAIM ONLY THAT THE SPIRIT, NOT NOT THE LETTER, OF U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT HAS BEEN CONTRADICTED. ARTICLE IS THUS A SOBER TREATMENT OF SOME THEMES THE SOVIETS FIND UNCOMFORTABLE IN CURRENT U.S. MILITARY POLICY DISCUSSIONS, COUCHED IN LANGUAGE EVIDENTLY CALCULATED NOT TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF EMOTIONS. IF IT IS MEANT TO SIGNAL ANYTHING ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN STRATEGIC SPHERE (AND THIS IS DEBATABLE), THE MESSAGE WOULD APPEAR TO BE THAT THERE IS SOME QUESTIONING HERE OF U.S. MOTIVES AND SOME OLD PAVLOVIAN REACTIONS TO REAL OR PERCEIVED U.S. MILITARY SUPERIORITY AS A RESULT OF PUBLIC AIRING IN U.S. OF NEW DOCTRINES AND PLANS FOR QUALITATIVE UPGRADING OF WEAPONS.

10. IN FACT, SOVIET DISTASTS FOR AIRING SUCH PROBLEMS PUBLICLY MAY GO A LONG WAY TOWARD EXPLAINING SOVIET REACTIONS TO REMARKS BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND GENERAL GOODPASTER. RECENTLY COL. KULISH, WHO FOLLOWS STRATEGIC DOCTRINE AT THE MEMO INSTITUTE, TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT HE FOUND NOTHING NEW IN THE TARGETTING DOCTRINE DESCRIBED BY SCHLESINGER AND WOULD HAVE BEEN SURPRISED HAD THE U.S. NOT BEEN FOLLOWING SUCH A POLICY; HE SAID HE ASSUMED SCHLESINGER'S REMARKS WERE INTENDED FOR OTHER THAN SOVIET EARS. SUCH A RELAXED CONFIDENTIAL

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ATTITUDE DOES NOT IN OUR VIEW REFLECT A SPLIT AMONG SOVIET STUDENTS OF THE SUBJECT BUT MERELY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD AND FRANK JUDGEMENTS ON THE REAL SITUATION. IN DISCUSSING THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS, WE HAVE FOLLOWED LINE THAT PUBLIC AIRING OF THE ISSUES IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING IN THE U.S. WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED FOR BROAD NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR ANY AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE EVENTUALLY SIGNED.
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